資料1-1
Japanese Fiscal Policy: The Path forward
Olivier Blanchard
March 26, 2026
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History: Primary Deficits and the Increase in Debt
Net debt ratio: from 20% in 1990 to about 130% today
Why the large rise? Two distinct reasons:
Low growth, political constraints, and optimistic forecasts
Sustaining weak private demand, monetary policy at the ZLB
Less of an issue now? End of secular stagnation? Likely, but
not certain.
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How much to worry about a high but stable debt ratio?
Depends fundamentally on (r − g )
If (r − g ) > 0 (standard textbook):
Welfare: Displacement of capital in portfolios; lower output later
Dynamics: Debt ratio increases even if primary deficit equals
zero
Need a primary surplus to stabilize debt ⇒ higher taxes
If (r − g ) < 0:
Welfare: Displacement not very costly (“dynamic inefficiency”
result)
Dynamics: Debt ratio decreases on its own, with zero primary
deficit
Can afford a (limited) primary deficit and still stabilize the debt
ratio
But: Even if (r − g ) < 0: amplification of (r − g ) uncertainty.
Dynamics depend on (r − g ) × b
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The Costs of a Steadily Increasing Debt:
If forecasts of debt are for a steady increase, then doom loop:
Higher spread → faster increase in debt → higher spread → · · ·
Costly, even in the absence of actual default
Risk of multiple equilibria/runs/sudden stops. Worries about
sustainability lead to further shifts in investors’ positions.
When to worry? When investors feel that there is loss of control.
No hard red line, depends on:
Nature of investors: Domestic/foreign
Maturity of the debt (relevance of zero maturity BOJ reserves)
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Japan’s Current Fiscal Position
High debt (relevant concept must include BOJ interest-paying reserves)
Current (r − g ) negative — largely due to issuance of debt when
interest rate was zero
Future (r − g ): reasonable forecast (r − g ) = 0, so need at least for
primary balance
Currently: small primary deficit but still decrease in debt ratio due to
(r − g ) < 0
But in a few years, will need at least zero primary balance.
Put another way: Aim at least for nominal debt growing in line with
nominal GDP
Uncertainty plus high debt level suggest aiming for a small primary
surplus.
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Building a Coherent Program
The basic tool: “SDSA” — dynamic simulations of debt under uncertainty
First use: assess the distribution of the current trajectory under existing policies
At two horizons: 5 and 20 years (reliability of medium vs. longterm forecasts)
Allows assessment of implicit liabilities;
Anticipate contingencies, so as not to need a supplemental budget every year
Second use: assess distribution of trajectories under proposed policies
SDSAs provide a shared platform for informed discussion
Precious for discussions of demographics, r ∗ , and degree of uncertainty
Of the essence: Must be produced by an independent fiscal council
To create a process that is visibly transparent, and credible
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Implementation
Multi-annual plan: a contingent path for primary balances, with a
clear end goal
Of the essence: a credible medium-term trajectory for primary
balances, with at least debt stabilization at the end of the horizon
Over how many years?
Too fast: weak private demand constraint; risk of returning to
ZLB — work with BOJ
Too slow: no credibility
Avoid mechanical year-by-year adjustment
Implementation — choice between two approaches:
Annual SDSA and adjustment ex post each year
Fiscal rules, with escape clauses
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Public Investment
Should not get an automatic pass to be financed by debt
Most needed public investment does not generate enough future fiscal
revenues:
Defense, global warming
Reform-induced investments with uncertain returns: education,
research
“Strategic investments that enhance resilience against potential
crises”
SDSA is the right tool to assess the effect on the evolution of the
debt distribution
Still, if investment is urgent and required increase in taxation cannot
happen immediately:
Accept a temporary increase (or smaller temporary decrease) in the
primary deficit, so long as it preserves eventual debt stabilization
Need for transparency: separate investment account, with spending
and likely revenues
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資料2-1
Japan in a Higher-Rate World
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy
Government of Japan
March 26, 2026
Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University
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The post-crisis low-rate world was the
exception for the global economy
• The global economy has moved away from the deflationary,
ultra-low-rate, low-inflation world that followed the 2007–08
financial crisis through the pandemic.
• Japan is not immune to the higher global rate environment.
• Long-term rates in Japan are more likely to rise than fall,
potentially reaching 3% over the coming decade.
• The forces pushing rates higher — debt, populism,
geopolitical fragmentation, military spending, and AIrelated investment — are likely to prove stronger than the
forces that have been pushing them lower, including
inequality, demography and low productivity growth.
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The low-rate world is fading
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Where Japan can build
• Markets are constantly being reshaped, so Japan should
start from areas where it already has real strengths.
• That points especially to robotics and advanced
manufacturing.
• Energy is another such area, including a larger role for
nuclear power in the energy mix.
• Defense-related capabilities will also matter more in a more
dangerous world; on the plus side, military R&D often has
important civilian spillovers.
• The plan to make the government less reliant on
supplementary budgets would increase predictability and
thus help support both public and private investment.
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Preparing for higher rates
• In a world of higher interest rates, Japan will need to
preserve room for the debt-to-GDP ratio to fall gently in
normal times (which seem to be happening less and less
often).
• That argues for keeping the primary deficit near balance
outside crises.
• Government debt is deeply embedded in the financial
system, so if rates rise too quickly, the challenge will be
financial as well as fiscal.
• Consumption tax relief may make sense in some
circumstances, but policymakers will need to be responsive
if interest rates rise sharply.
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Global instability and a weakening of
dollar hegemony
• A major macroeconomic risk for Japan is growing instability
in the global economy, including uncertainty over policy in
the United States and other major economies.
• Alongside trade tensions, financial restrictions, and
geopolitical conflict, this could weaken the dollar-centered
system and hasten a shift toward a more multipolar order,
with the renminbi playing a larger role in Asia and the euro,
crypto assets, and gold gaining importance.
• For Japan, this raises a broader strategic question: whether
it is resilient to a less stable dollar-centered system.
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Appendix:
Secular stagnation was the exception
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配付資料1-2
The Takaichi administration's economic and fiscal policies
March 2026
Cabinet Office
Basic Diagnosis
Japan has strong underlying strengths—high technological innovation capabilities and the
efficiency of labor —yet domestic investment has been insufficient, and the potential growth
rate is declining.
Japan must sever the trends of excessive austerity and underinvestment in the future; the
government should step forward to catalyze private investment.
Crisis Management Investments and Growth Investments
Crisis-Management Investments: minimize strategic risks through targeted investment in
economic security; food, energy and critical resources; national resilience; health and
disaster preparedness; cybersecurity; and related areas.
Growth Investments: scale up investment in R&D, talent, frontier technologies, AI, startups,
mass production and social implementation, and global market expansion.
Through public–private coordination, boldly boost domestic investment strategically and
increase employment, income, and productivity.
Reforming the Budget Framework/ Fiscal Rules
To support efforts taken by both private-sector entities and local governments, and with a
view to ensuring the predictability of government budgets, we will fundamentally overhaul
the way the national budget is created, such as by making a clean break from our current
budget formulation process in which it is assumed that a supplementary budget will be
compiled each fiscal year, and instead allocating all necessary funds within the initial
budget, to the extent possible.
(Example)Investment promotion measures through fiscal outlays across multiple fiscal
years with securing of necessary resources, and funding that is provided over the long
term.
Ensure fiscal sustainability through strategic choices across the budget
(Example)Administrative and fiscal reform, including establishment of an Office for the
Review of Special Measures Concerning Taxation and Subsidies
Make clear indicators for steadily reducing the government debt-to-GDP ratio.
Household Support
A suspension of the consumption tax, which is limited to food and beverage items and only
for a period of two years.
Introduction of a refundable tax credit system: concentrate support on those who need it
most and improve the precision of household assistance.
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How It Differs from Abenomics
Abenomics, the “three arrows” (bold monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy, and growth
strategy), focused on exiting deflation and stimulating demand.
So-called Sanaenomics, centered on “responsible and proactive public finances,” with:
• Boldly promote domestic investment strategically through public–private
coordination, raise supply capacity (higher potential growth) , and generate a
virtuous cycle of investment and growth.
Sources: Policy Speech by the Prime Minister (221st Session of the Diet), Economic Policy
Speech (221st Session of the Diet), Materials from the Council on Economic and
Fiscal Policy
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